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Abstract What could be the legitimation basis of the Euro-
pean Union (EU)? This article questions the idea of two
constitution-making subjects in the EU and claim there is
and can only be one constituting subject even in a multilevel
configuration like the EU. The EU can thus not be seen as a
federation of nation states. Rather it must be seen as a quasi-
federation of states and citizens united under a common legal
framework with a universalistic underpinning. The EU’s com-
mitment to basic human principles means that it has a com-
munal vocation that is broader and more universal than that of
a multinational federation.
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Let us remember that the unity movement in Europe was
precisely an attempt at creating a regional entity, and
that its origins and its springs resembled, on the reduced
scale of a half-continent, the process dreamed up by
Kant in his Idea of Universal History.
[14: 863]
Through establishing autonomous, powerful institutions,
the states of the conflict-ridden European continent have
domesticated international relations among themselves.1
However, juridification and executive dominance prevails
and the lingering question is whether the ensuing order can
be legitimate. The EU is not a nation, nor is it a state. Never-
theless, the institutional complex of the Union, the compe-
tences, and the procedures it now harbours for participation,
contestation, and representation testify to the fact that the EU
has moved in the direction of a rights-based quasi-federation
with democratic credentials. Even though it does not possess
sovereign control in a clearly delimited territory, it claims to
possess a legitimate authority based on entrenched principles
of law as well as a set of representative political institutions for
collective will formation. The multilevel constellation that
makes up the Union does not possess the organisational
powers of a state and is deficient in democratic terms. The
citizens are not fully able to govern themselves through a self-
appointed and accountable government. This deficiency is
exacerbated by establishing intergovernmental treaties outside
of the ordinary Lisbon procedure in order to deal with the
Eurozone crisis.2 I cannot deal with the potentially disastrous
effect on EU’s ‘constitution’ here, but see [7], chapter 1 and 6.
There is an unfinished agenda with regard to institutional
reforms as well as with regard to what kind of competencies
and functions should be ‘communitarianized’ in Europe [6].
Neither is it evident what the EU is or should aspire to be. I
argue that the EU’s normativity requires a wider cosmopolitan
frame of reference in order to address the character of the
entity as well as its legitimacy basis. This article therefore sets
out the idea of the EU as a regional cosmopolitan entity. But
how can the EU be sustainable when it has no monopoly on
the legitimate use of force or final decision-making power?
What would make up the finalité of the European integration
project that could ensure the requisite commitment and loyalty
needed for binding collective decision-making?
In order to shed light on these questions, I first address why
there is a European context of justice beyond the nation state;
2 For the disastrous effect on the EU’s ‘constitution’, see [7], chapter 1
and 6.
1 This article draws on [7].
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then I discuss the claim that supranationalism leads to com-
petition over final decision-making authority. The solution to
this problem is found in the fusion of constitutional orders and
in a shared ‘Grundnorm’ in European normative orders. I take
issue with Jürgen Habermas’ idea of a “Federation of Euro-
pean nation states” and claim there is and can only be one
constituting subject even in a multilevel configuration like the
EU. This finally paves the way for seeing the EU as a non-
state government with a universalistic foundation and
vocation.
Power beyond the nation state
According to the ‘sovereignists’, norms of justice stem from
the distinctive relations that people have towards each other in
the obligatory and coercive frame of reference of a state.
Without the ‘enabling condition of sovereignty’—with ‘some
form of law, with the centralized authority to determine the
rules and a centralized monopoly of power of enforcement’—
there can be no justice and democracy according to [26: 116].
Nagel follows [32] whose political conception of justice is
fully associative. It depends on the positive rights that we have
towards our fellow national compatriots and not against other
persons and groups. Beyond the nation state, democracy and
justice do not apply.3 There are no obligations of distributive
justice among nations because citizenship rights do not apply.
However, in the EU they do in fact apply.
Even though the EU is not a state with a monopoly on the
legitimate use of violence, it amounts to a powerful command-
ing height to be seized by the citizenry. Compared to what is
the case with ordinary regimes and international organizations
in the transnational realm, the EU is ‘more’. European states’
self-help means of reciprocity and countermeasures have been
removed, and the institutions of the EU affect the freedom,
security and well-being of all the subjects – they benefit and
threaten, reward and punish EU citizens as well as third
parties. Hence, a particular context of social cooperation ex-
ists, which gives rise to obligations and legitimate claims.
There are morally arbitrary sources of equality that are in
breach with the principle of equal citizenship; and the Euro-
pean Treaties have achieved the function of a superior legal
structure, which establish both a unitary European citizenry
distinct from national ones and a set of autonomous European
bodies. There is thus a comparable context of justice and
democracy to that of the nation states. However, then there
is a second claim of the ‘sovereignists’, that is that the
establishment of supranational, coercive power would mean
a competition for final authority – for control of centralised
authority – with the nation states.4 The case of the EU shows,
as we shall see, that there need not be a struggle for final
authority, when the legal basis is the same for all adjudicative
bodies.
Globalisation, increased international cooperation and Eu-
ropean integration have changed the basic conditions for
democratic self-rule. Not only is there a context of justice
and democracy beyond the nation state in Europe due to the
particular circumstances of cooperation, there are also institu-
tions and structures amounting to dominance. Dominance,
which is rule without justification, is an expression of injustice
and illegitimate government. Dominance is illicit because of
the dominators’ capacity to interfere in zones of freedom [31,
35]. The right not to be subjected to arbitrary power is funda-
mental [33] and so is the right to justification [8]. How can
authoritative institutions equipped with an organised capacity
to make binding decisions and allocate resources exist at the
European level, claim to be legitimate?
The fusion of constitutional orders
It is widely held that there is in fact no constitutional unity in
the EU in the sense that there is no willingness to contemplate
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as the sole judicial master
of both legal orders. Constitutional pluralism prevails [2].
There is, however, a distinct constitutional tradition
established by the EU, which, according to [9], can be seen
to represent the first instance of establishing a new constitu-
tional order out of a set of already existing state-based con-
stitutional arrangements. The EU was initially established
through a distinct and historically specific constitutional
authorization in the sense that the member states’ constitu-
tions sanctioned supranational integration. The process origi-
nated with the ‘synthetic constitutional moment’ of The Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel community (ECSC), which brought
forth the regulatory ideal of a common constitutional law.
The construction comes equipped with a conditional li-
cense from the member states, viz., the established structure
and further integrative moves must comply with human
rights and democratic norms. The democratic character of
the EU’s constitutionalism hinges on this core requirement.
On the one hand, the EU system must be compatible with
the basic constitutional norms and principles shared by the
constitutions of the member states. On the other hand,
European institutions must be structured so that it is possible
for the citizens to understand themselves as the authors of
the laws to which they are subject. Direct popular authori-
zation is not abolished but rather suspended so as to preserve
3 John Rawls’ [32] view is that since global citizens cannot be supposed
to see themselves as free and equal human beings who should relate fairly
to each other, we cannot build coercive social institutions that assume
they do. This position comes close to a communitarian one as it holds that
only according to a collective identity – to a self-image reasonable
acceptable to them – could individuals be coerced [40: 63]. 4 On this debate, see also the contributions in [29].
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peace and deal with economic growth. This in itself has
legitimating force [39: 68].
However, the further the constitutionalizing process pro-
ceeds, the greater the need for direct popular authorization
and sanction. This is in line with the so-called Solange
judgments of the German Constitutional Court, which made
further integration and ceding of sovereignty conditional on
democratization. Solange 1 from 1974 establishes that as
long as European law does not protect fundamental rights
equivalent to that provided by national law nor has achieved
the similar level of democratic legitimacy for its law-making
power, the Court would keep reviewing secondary Commu-
nity law according to the standards of the national
Constitution.
Even though there is no formal EU constitution, and the EU
treaties do not meet the democratic standard, EU law, which
stems from and is embedded in the member states’ democratic
constitutions, grounds the presumption of acceptability. Ob-
servance of this structure ensures not only that the EU struc-
ture is seen as constitutionally sanctioned but also that the EU
structure has an element of popular authorisation. Compliance
can be expected because
(a) the initial authorization of European integration, through
the establishment of the ECSC was voluntary,
(b) the ensuing applications for membership by individual
states have generally been supported by popular referen-
da and
(c) citizens’ representatives are involved in the decision-
making procedures through which EU law is made.
The EU then does not represent a constitutionalization of
already constitutionalized orders – an imperio in imperium –
but a fusion of orders.
Two constitution-making subjects?
In line with such a perspective, [12]5 contends that the EU’s
basic ‘constitutional’ order represents two major innovations
in the process of pacifying the state of nature between states:
First, supremacy of EU law is granted in the areas in which it
has competences but the binding effect of EU law is neither
grounded in the monopoly of violence at the European level
nor in the final decision-making authority of the EU. The EU
does not have the competence to increase its own compe-
tences (‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’) and does not possess coer-
cive means, but can nevertheless count in compliance for the
reasons mentioned. The second innovation has to do with the
sharing of the constitution-making power between the citizens
and the states (the European peoples). Democracy in the
Union rests on two pillars.6 The EU is a union of states and
of citizens – as epitomised by the role of the Council com-
posed of member states representatives and the directly
elected EP, representing the states and the citizens respective-
ly. The treaties speak of the peoples of the member states and
of the citizens of the Union.7
Habermas builds on this construction in foreseeing not a
European federation based on hierarchy and the unity of law
directly emanating from an empowered Parliament and basic
rights. Rather, his model is that of a federation of nation states
founded on a shared sovereignty between ‘the “citizens” and
the “peoples” as the constitution founding subjects [12: 54].
The nation state is seen as the main container of solidarity and
democratic legitimation. But the term ‘a federation of nation
states’ sits uneasily with the idea of democracy as a self-
governing citizenry as well as with Habermas’ own claim that
we should not substantialise ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ [12:
48].8 Hence, the people cannot be the’the unum’ but must be
“the plures or the plurality or the singular” [cp. 31: 301].
Popular sovereignty can only legitimately appear in
pluralis – it demands access for persons, not groups or states,
to a procedure of co-legislation.
Citizens’ sovereignty cannot be divided or shared with
another kind of sovereignty. A collective subject like ‘a peo-
ple’ or a state cannot be put on par with popular sovereignty as
this would blur the distinction between popular and state
sovereignty. The following question arises: How to secure
the autonomy of the citizens if there is also the autonomy of
a collective (macro) subject – the state – to be safeguarded?
This construction devaluates the democratic principles of
citizens’ self-rule. There would be no criterion for approxi-
mating the autonomy principle – citizens should only obey
laws that they also have been the co-authors of – when it is
discounted and weighed against the state principle. Therefore,
there can be pooling of state sovereignty but not a disaggre-
gation of political subject-hood – of popular sovereignty –
which then can be shared between two constitutional subjects.
Moreover, even though the member states de facto are ‘the
Masters of the Treaties’, over time intergovernmentalism has
increasingly been countered by the struggle for ‘a citizens
Europe’ (as is most salient in the assignment of EU citizenship
in the Treaty of Maastricht and in the EU’s Charter of Funda-
mental Rights linked to the Lisbon Treaty). Two constitution-
making subjects have not only been cooperating but also
competing in establishing the EU as it is. The European
Communities may not initially have had much power or many
5 He draws on the works of [36, 37, 10].
6 Cf. Arts. 9 to 12 and 19(2) TEU, and compare with [30]. See further [38:
497].
7 See also [22: 24ff] for the wording on ‘Federation of Nation States’ and
‘European people’ in the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.
8 Supra-individual entities, such as a people, a majority or a state, are not
self-authenticating sources of valid claims [23: 152]. The people is a
bodiless category [19].
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competences at their disposal, but with the aim of furthering
integration and closer cooperation, accompanied with the
attainment of requested means, they transformed the constit-
uent parties into committed members. The Euro polity has in
the last decades undergone a marked change – from a largely
economic organisation whose legitimacy was derivative of the
member states – to an entity that today asserts that it represents
an independent source of democratic legitimacy. A struggle
for a ‘citizens Europe’ has been going on in the form of a
struggle for an empowered EP and a constitution based on
basic rights.
On this background one may question Habermas’ model.
The idea of two constitution-making subjects makes the EU
shaky with regard to foundational principles. For an order to
achieve stability and legitimacy, agreement on the basic struc-
ture is required, as well as on the polity structure that corre-
sponds to it. Systems of domination require justification with
regard to the relevant characteristics of the political commu-
nity to be regulated as well as with regard to the purposes and
interests to be realised. In the capacity of what are Europeans
equals?When the EU asks the individuals to see themselves as
European and not merely national citizens – what could then
be seen as a trigger of equal concern and respect? The
question is what the constitutive norms – the common Euro-
pean weal – are that express the distinctive relations of Euro-
pean citizens, and which could be the basis for solidarity
among Europeans. In what does the political unversitas of
the EU consist and where does it reside [cp. 15: 346]? The
weakness of Habermas’ reconstruction of a legitimate EU is
that the requisite unifying component of the European politi-
cal order is lacking.
The European nation states are profoundly affected by
accession to the European Communities and, as we have seen,
the integration process has constrained their willpower and
has Europeanised identities. Moreover, the EU is a polity in its
own right, which contributes to global steering. It possesses
higher-level political decision-making capabilities, but pos-
sesses neither a collective identity nor the coercive instru-
ments of a state. We are witnessing a federation without a
state, but how can it be cohesive and effective without com-
petence to override the nation state, to constrain as well as
enlarge national mentalities; and how can it be legitimate
without a we-feeling and a sense of finalité that can provide
the necessary foundation for collective European decision-
making?
The constituting subject
Due to the pooled sovereignty of states and common consti-
tutional traditions of European states, the question is not
which level possesses the final decision-making authority,
but rather whether the ruling complies with the law; whether
the common legal norms are applied in a correct manner. It is
only in the applicative sense that the EU enjoys primacy, and
not when it comes to validity. Community law leaves ‘incon-
sistent national law valid but unapplied’ [36: 14]. The multi-
level legal order in Europe, with national courts and the ECJ
(and in some cases also the European Court of Human Rights)
sharing jurisdictional power, ensures, in principle, the judicial
monitoring of laws, the ability to handle ‘conflicts of law’, and
to reach conclusions in hard cases within a time limit. But on
what basis? What is the single unifying principle?
The constituting subject of treaties are states, and the con-
stituting subject of constitutions is the individual. Both lines of
authority have one single origin: the citizen as member of the
Union and of one or more member states. Only the rights of
the individual and the legal procedure and discipline that go
with it, give unity and coherence to EU law in the multilevel
constellation. At the foundational level, there is no competi-
tion between the member states and the European level; the
basic unit for which both levels can claim legitimacy is the
individual, her dignity and autonomy. There is and can only be
one constituting subject even in a multilevel configuration like
the EU.
When there is a common legal basis and the individual is
the sole source of legitimation for the EU, it is not necessary to
settle once and for all who has the final decision-making
authority: the EU or the member states. Who has the
competence-competence need not be settled because to be
subordinate to supranational (democratically enacted) law is
not to be dominated by an alien power but subjected to co-
authored law. Joint European rule entails the capacity to co-
determine the exercise of authority and not the final power of
arbitration. Supremacy can be seen as a collision norm, which
says that European law should prevail when there is conflict
with national law.
But what could form the basis for establishing supremacy
as a collision norm, if not the protection of human rights?
Along these lines [38] suggest the reversed Solange aimed at
protecting the fundamental rights against EU member states.
Any member state’s violation of human rights is infringing the
‘substance of Union Citizenship’. On the basis of European
citizenship and on the basis of the adopted European Charter
of Fundamental Rights, which apply only when the member
states are implementing Union Law, reversed Solange holds
that ‘Member States remain autonomous in fundamental
rights protection as long as it can be presumed that they ensure
the essence of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Article
2 TEU’ [38: 491].
Dignity as basic norm
Both in a legal and in a normative sense, the individual citizen
must be seen to constitute the sole source of legitimation of
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modern constitutional orders. All modern legal orders are
essentially individualistic orders as they universalise the legal
principle of rights-based adjudication. They build on a proce-
dural consensus – on the rules for inclusion, hearing, deliber-
ation and decision-making. The right of the human being
constitutes the foundation of modern law, which basically
comes down to a right to have its dignity respected [cp. 24].
Also in the EU, the single authority which can give unity and
coherence to the legal system in place is the individual in the
form of a right-bearing subject. The German Federal Consti-
tutional Court’s 2009 judgment expresses the general point in
the following manner:
The constitutional state commits itself to other states
with the same foundation of values of freedom and
equal rights and which, like itself, make human dignity
and the principles of equal entitlement to personal free-
dom the focal point of their legal order.
(par. 221)
The basic democratic criterion is autonomy in which self and
law is conjoined. That is, autonomy has two roots: autos (=self)
and nomos (=law). Autonomy is the basis for dignity and is,
according to Kant, located in the law-making procedure. The
law must be self-given and this is the core of dignity:
For, nothing can have a worth other than that which the
law determines for it. But the lawgiving itself, which
determines all value, must for that reason have dignity,
that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the
word respect alone provides a becoming estimate of it
that a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore
the ground of dignity of human nature and of every
rational nature.
[17: 85]9
Dignity resides in the law-making process: It places the law
under the constraint of being ‘self-given’ and co-authored.
The individual autonomy is being constrained by the fact that
the autonomy of each must co-exist with the freedom of all.
There is a right to have ones dignity respected which can only
be ensured by being granted a right to participate in law-
making [34: 62, 100]. Dignity is a value in itself, and is a
basis for deriving rights. The right of the individual to have its
dignity protected both links in with the cosmopolitan norm of
equal respect for the individual and with democracy as it
grants the individual right to participation in law-making.
Cosmopolitanism implies the universalization of human dig-
nity – all human beings possess it equally – but the right to
have ones dignity respected requires democracy, that is, a
bounded territory [cp. 20]). Dignity grants the human being
membership in two communities, in the moral commonwealth
– in the community of all human beings – and in a state.
The political universitas of the EU
On the one hand, the right to have ones dignity protected is a
demand for democracy that can only be cashed in through
membership in a particular political order – with borders. On
the other hand, national democracies have incentives to take a
free ride on others and impose negative externalities on third
parties without compensation. A particular state can violate its
own citizens’ rights, can fail to respect individuals with no
membership rights and other states’ legitimate interests. Inte-
gration itself and democracy among states thus become cate-
gorical imperatives. Democracy requires that the citizens,
when their rights to have their dignities respected have been
infringed, can bring their grievances before a superior author-
ity. Any ‘people’ can get it wrong, and needs correctives;
majority decisions can violate the rights of individuals and
minorities, and national, constitutional courts may be lacking
or may not be able to protect them. For a true republic to be
realised, it must be possible for citizens to appeal to bodies
above the nation state when their rights are threatened. Thus,
there are reasons for institutions beyond a particular state in
which individuals have obtained membership and which pro-
tect the basic rights of the citizen.
For the dignity of the world citizen – kosmou politês – to be
respected, human rights need to be institutionalised in bodies
above the nation states that actually bind individual govern-
ments and international actors. Already the principle of neg-
ative peace requires a superordinate instance to safeguard the
right to non-interference [28: 293]. Organizations at the inter-
mediate level – between the state level and the world organiza-
tion – reduce dominance, facilitate accountability across borders
and provide the ‘international community’ with some agency.
Dignity is firmly entrenched in the UN charter, in interna-
tional conventions and treaties; in national constitutions, in
particular in the German Constitution. It is also referred to
several times in the German Federal Constitutional Court’s
ruling on the Lisbon Treaty (pars 57, 147, 188, 122). It figures
prominently in EU Treaties; in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty,
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The latter places
dignity-protecting human rights as core legitimating princi-
ples: In Article 1, it is stated that human dignity is inviolable. It
must be respected and protected. Article 2 states the right to
life and prohibits detah penalty. Article 3 specifies the right to
the integrity of the person, and Article 4 the prohibition of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The Preamble of the Charter states that:
Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union
is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human
9 Cp. [13], who sees human dignity as constituting the moral source of
human rights.
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dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on
the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places
the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing
the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of
freedom, security and justice. (Italics inserted.)
One may thus speak of an (underlying) ground norm, of
having ones dignity respected in the EU. Human dignity is the
real foundation of basic rights [22: 59]. It is a principle that
digs deeper than the ordinary rights we live by in Europe and
one that is in need of specification and institutionalisation. I
see dignity as a foundational ‘must’ of European integration.10
It constitutes the moral-affective basis for peace and rights-
based democracy and has been an important unifying princi-
ple, enabling Europeans of different stripes to come to grips
with their belligerent past. The ultimate aim of the integration
process, and to which others like peace, justice and democracy
speak, is to protect the dignity of the individual. This is a
foundational norm that all, in fact, would agree to, despite all
other disagreements over values and interests. It could not be
rejected with mutually acceptable reasons, and in fact it was
vigorously struggled for by Catholics, Protestants and Hu-
manists and supported by liberalists, conservatives and
socialists.
The normativity of co-legislation
Dignity-protecting rights go to the core of modern constitu-
tions – as they set the rules for a free and equal association of
self-ruling citizens – and of the procedural arrangements of
modern representative orders. Equal human rights, enfran-
chisement, one man one vote, freedom of expression, rules
for deliberation, voting, and fair bargaining, make up the
normative core of modern representative democracies, and
have left a strong and lasting imprint on the European inte-
gration process.
Having ones dignity protected requires the abolition of
dominance through participation in a co-legislative procedure.
Dignity and the moral package that goes with it is reflected in
the clauses for inclusion and for equal-treatment that are
entrenched in present-day political arrangements as well as
visible in the contestation, critique and opposition to power
structures. They are salient standards for critique and valida-
tion. These rights and rules are consensual principles
protecting the internal dignity and external freedom of indi-
viduals. They are moral in nature and command the obser-
vance of all. The rules for inclusion and for equal treatment
personify the principles of equal citizenship and membership
in a body that inclusively and continuously engages in
processes of collective self-determination – in processes of
opinion and will formation. Only bodies that tie representa-
tives into a structure of political accountability – of contesta-
tion and public deliberation – can claim to have
institutionalised political equality and protected individuals’
dignity.
The moral standard of having ones dignity respected is a
higher-ranking principle that does not have the same sort of
validity as the constitutional principles we live by; it is con-
stitutive for the concept of basic individual human rights and
for political equality. Generally, the power and agency of the
state is needed for rights’ protection. How close to statehood
the EU needs to come, requires attention to the character and
future of the states’ system.
Conditional sovereignty
In the Westphalian order, states are sovereign with fixed
territorial boundaries and are entitled to conduct their internal
and external affairs autonomously, without external actors
checking their protection of human rights. But, as seen, legal
developments over the last century have been remarkable, and
one of their main thrusts has been to protect human rights.
Both persons and groups have become recognised as subjects
of international law. There are no lawless areas left. The
Westphalian condition of organised anarchy is replaced by
conditional state sovereignty; conditional in compliance with
citizens’sovereignty. The very concept of sovereignty has thus
changed, from denoting the state’s supreme legal authority to
uphold the law within a certain territory and being indepen-
dent from any external authority [25: 321], to one that subjects
state power to higher-order principles. In principle, states
enjoy the rights of political sovereignty and territorial integrity
only as long as they are governed in a morally tolerable way.
However, the duty to intervene or to help cannot fall on the
international community as a whole as it does not possess
agency.
Accordingly, there is ‘a general moral argument for inter-
national government – at a minimum, for establishing and
developing political institutions to prevent violence not only
between but within states’ [27: 458, 463]. But what could be
the right form of such a government? While communitarians
run the risk of seeing the nation state as the only possible form
for a people’s union, and thus of conceiving of the nation state
as an end in itself, cosmopolitans run the opposite danger of
glossing over all distinctions and differences. For the latters,
borders have only a derived status, and no independent value:
assignment of responsibilities follows from the institutional
division of labour. Lower-level communities – local, national,
and regional governments – are thus merely needed for func-
tional and prudential reasons. In this perspective, the freedom
and welfare of human beings will best be secured by
10 It has both a religious/catholic origin and a secular/human one, see
[34, 16].
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organizing the human population into different societies, each
with its own political institutions specialised in realizing the
interests and rights of the citizens. For cosmopolitans and
liberals, borders have no intrinsic value. In a rights-based (as
well as in an instrumental) perspective, cosmopolitanism is
seen as providing ‘support for a multi-level system of gover-
nance in which supra-state authorities monitor the conduct of
states (and powerful economic and social institutions) and
seek to ensure their compliance with cosmopolitan ideals of
justice’ [4: 182].
However, democracy is a demand of dignity, as well as of
justice. Democracy is an inalienable right which requires
borders to be cashed in. The right to collective self-
determination requires delimitations of territory, membership
rights, institutions, and procedures. As integration is required
by practical reason when power is wielded arbitrarily interna-
tionally, there is a call for democracy beyond the nation state.
But for orders to be legitimate, democratic conditions
pertaining to representation, voting, public debate and politi-
cal competition must be met. They are required to meet the
autonomy criterion, viz., that the citizens should be able to see
themselves as authors of the law they are to abide by.
Europe is held up as a particularly relevant site for the
emergence of cosmopolitanism as well as post-national de-
mocracy by many academics. 11 A multidisciplinary company
of scholars draws variously on transnationalism; on the notion
of the EU as a new form of Community; and on the EU’s
global transformative potential through acting as a civilian
power. According to official documents, cosmopolitanism is
part of the self-identity of the EU as it places the individual at
the core; and scholars increasingly recognise the EU as a part
of, and as a vanguard for, an emerging democratic world
order. But the cosmopolitan condition, which requires the
constitutionalization of international law, cannot draw its le-
gitimacy from the international law regime itself or from the
putative validity of humanitarian norms. Human rights do not
in themselves make up an actionable and meaningful social
order [11]. The number and content of rights must be
ascertained [18: 399], and they must be rooted in culture and
practice. The right-bearing world citizens have not much in
common except for their common humanity [21]. But the EU
is, as we have seen, a heavily embedded rights-based polity
and one with a distinct regional reach. It is embedded in a
political culture and premised on a common constitutional
complex; on the values and democratic practices in Europe.
This normative infrastructure lends legitimacy to the proceed-
ings and collective decision-making of the post-national
Union and constitutes a vital part of the common self-
understandings of the citizenry.
When embedded in such a legally regulated sphere, we
could conceive of the state not as a dichotomous variable but
in terms of degrees of stateness – on a continuum with the
autarchic state and the world society as end points. Means of
coercion for protecting rights and realizing collective goals
would be shared between levels.Within such a framework, the
EU could claim legitimacy for its decisions by reference to the
legal form they are dressed in, rather than with reference to
some form of collective identity and superiority.
A regional subset
The upshot is that organizations at the intermediate level come
to the fore not merely as policy instruments following the
institutional division of labour requested by cosmopolitanism
but as vital means to realise the inalienable right to self-rule –
to democracy. The EU is the most prominent example of such
regional organizations – and is the only political organization
beyond the nation state equipped with a democratic mandate
and some capacity to act collectively. It performs some state
functions and possesses some representative structures. An
intermediate order which ‘places the individual at the heart of
its activities’ can be conceived of as a regional subset of an
emerging larger cosmopolitan order. In such a perspective, the
borders of the EU could be drawn both with regard to what is
required for the Union itself in order to be a self-sustainable
and well-functioning democratic entity and with regard to the
support and further development of similar regional associa-
tions in the rest of the world—that is, with regard to the
viability of regional cooperation such as the African Union,
the post-Soviet states, Mercosur, the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The borders of the EU could thus
be drawn with regard to functional requirements both for itself
and for other regions, all within the framework of a reformed
global system.
This justificatory strategy implies that the Union would be
a political order whose internal standards are projected to its
external affairs; and further, that it would be a polity that
subjects its actions to higher-ranking principles – to ‘the
cosmopolitan law of the people’. The law-enforcement capac-
ity, as well as the democratic mandate, is weak although the
moral salience of such an order is high. In other words, such a
regional subset of the cosmopolitan order may be strong
normatively as it can draw on a far-reaching consensus on
moral individualism and human-rights protection. Such an
entity would be an answer to the claim that one should not
replicate the state model at the European level as the ‘system
of states’ is what makes necessary international organizations
in the first place. The nation states create problems for each
other as well as for the universal protection of human rights
and to upload the state model to the European level would
replicate the problems at the global level, hence it represents11 See e.g. [1, 3, 5].
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yesterday’s answers to yesterday’s problems. It should mod-
erate rather than replicate the state.
This model would conceive of the EU as a government
based on differentiating state functions, downplaying the co-
ercive elements and upgrading the normative-institutional
elements. As such, it presents us with an organisational tem-
plate that possesses a limited set of measures for ensuring
implementation and compliance. An organisation properly set
up according to these model tenets can accommodate a higher
measure of territorial-functional differentiation than can a
state-type entity. It does not presuppose the kind of ‘homoge-
neity’ or thick collective identity that is widely held to be
needed for comprehensive resource allocation, redistribution
and goal attainment. It is based on a division of labour be-
tween the levels, a sharing of sovereignty that relieves the
central level of certain demanding decisions.
Conclusion
One may question the sustainability of this template when it
comes to handling crises and hardships, but it is an answer to
the quest for a correct institutionalizing of human rights under
conditions of globalization. The EU can be conceived of as a
polity in its own right based on an authorised government,
which I depict as the political organization of society, viz., the
institutional arrangement of the political unit. A non-state
entity can make up a system of government in so far as it
performs the functions of sanctioned jurisdictions. The EU is
then not seen as a federation of nation states, but as a quasi-
federation of states and citizens united under a common legal
framework with a universalistic underpinning. The EU’s com-
mitment to basic human principles means that it has a com-
munal vocation that is broader and more universal than that of
a multinational federation.
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